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Making ﬂexible associations between what we see and what we do is important for many everyday tasks.
Previous work in patients with focal lesions has shown that the control of saccadic eye movements in such
contexts relies on a network of areas in the frontal cerebral cortex. These regions are reciprocally connected
with structures in the basal ganglia although the contribution of these sub-cortical structures to oculomotor
control in complex tasks is not well understood. We report the performance of patients with idiopathic
Parkinsons disease (PDs) in a test which required learning and switching between arbitrary cue-saccade rules.
In Experiment 1 feedback was given following each response which reliably indicated which of the two
possible rules was correct. PDs were slower to learn the ﬁrst cue-saccade association presented, but did not
show increased error or reaction time switch costs when switching between two rules within blocks. In a
follow up experiment the feedback given by the computer was adjusted to be probabilistic such that executing
a response based upon the “correct” rule only resulted in positive feedback on 80% of trials. Under these
conditions patients were impaired in terms of response latencies and number of errors. In all conditions PDs
showed multi-stepping/hypometria of saccades consistent with a motoric deﬁcit in executing actions based on
cognitive cues. The ﬁndings are consistent with a role for the nigrostriatal dopamine system in the
reinforcement of saccade-response-outcome associations. Intact performance of PDs when associations are
not stochastically reinforced suggests that striatal learning systems are complemented by cognitive representa-
tions of task rules which are unaffected in the early stages of PD.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
In order to perform everyday tasks such as cooking a meal,
changing a light bulb or driving a car appropriate task rules need
to be learned and maintained in working memory and then
transformed into appropriate motor (including oculomotor) out-
put to achieve task goals (Hodgson & Golding, 2003; Land &
Furneax, 1997). One potential neural substrate of this ability are
so-called cortico-striatal loops linking structures in the prefrontal
cortex with the basal ganglia. In this paper we describe the
performance of mild to moderately affected people with Parkinsons
disease (PDs) in a series of tasks involving learning and switching
between stimulus-saccade rules. Deﬁcits might be predicted in the
task in PDs on at least two counts. Firstly, dopamine is known tor Ltd.
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Open access under CC BY license.play an important modulatory role in cortico-striatal circuitry
(Chakravarthy, Joseph, & Bapi, 2010; Frank, 2005; Graybiel, 1997;
Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). Secondly, patients with focal
frontal cortex damage, schizophrenia and other types of striatal
pathology have already been shown to have performance deﬁcits in
the same or similar saccadic tasks (Golding, Danchaivijitr, Hodgson,
Tabrizi, & Kennard, 2006; Hodgson et al., 2007; Huddy, Hodgson,
Ron, Barnes, & Joyce, 2011; Husain, Parton, Hodgson, Mort, & Rees,
2003; Parton et al., 2007; Robert et al., 2009).
Post-mortum studies have conﬁrmed that dopaminergic cell
death in the substantia nigra pars compacta is consistently
observed across patients who have died with idiopathic Parkin-
sons Disease (PD). Whilst adjacent regions of the substantia nigra
(e.g. pars reticulata) can also be affected, cell death in these areas
occurs to a more variable extent across individuals (Damier,
Hirsch, Agid, & Graybiel, 1999). It is the reduction in the dopami-
nergic input from the substantia nigra pars compacta into the
striatum that initially gives rise to the motoric symptoms of the
disease. Post-mortum studies have shown that dopamine loss is
maximal within the putamen portion of the striatum during early
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nucleus is relatively unaffected, although signiﬁcant depletion is
found even in early stage patients within the head of the caudate.
Most recently, in vivo magnetic resonance diffusion tensor ima-
ging (DTI) studies have conﬁrmed that the head of the caudate is
connected to the medial, ventral and dorso-lateral prefrontal
cortex as well as the frontal pole and pre-supplementary motor
area (Lehericy et al., 2004). All of these cortical regions have been
strongly implicated in cognitive or cognitive-motor functions. One
commonly held interpretation of this neuro-anatomical organiza-
tion is that segregated cortico-striatal “loops” maintain the prin-
ciples of functional specialization of the overlying cortex such that
different loops subserve specialist motor, oculomotor and cogni-
tive functions (Alexander & Crutcher, 1990).
Although there is now overwhelming evidence for the exis-
tence of mild cognitive deﬁcits in the early stage of PD the exact
nature of these impairments and how they relate to the normal
functioning of basal ganglia circuits is still debated (Grahn,
Parkinson, & Owen, 2008; Middleton & Strick, 2000). One aspect
of the Parkinsonian cognitive syndrome is assumed to be a lack of
cognitive ﬂexibility as indexed by tests of attentional set-shifting
and task switching (Bowen, Kameinny, Burns, & Yahr, 1975; Cools,
Van den Bercken, Horstink, van Spaendonck, & Berger, 1984;
Downes et al., 1989; Flowers, & Robertson, 1985; Owen et al.,
1992, 1993). Many tasks of this type require several component
cognitive processes including working memory, shifting attention
between stimulus categories and error monitoring as well as
switching between stimulus-response mappings (the classic
example being the Wisconson Card sorting test, Grant & Berg,
1948). Cools, Barker, Sahakian, and Robbins (2001a) attempted to
disentangle attentional set from other task demands and report
increased task switch costs in PDs even when rules were explicitly
cued and patients did not have to learn rules by trial and error (i.e.
no working memory or error monitoring demands). The deﬁcit
was particularly marked under conditions for which each response
contingent stimulus was associated with two possible responses
depending upon the current task rule mapping (so called
“bi-valent” stimuli). However, an earlier study using less severely
affected PD patients and a near identical procedure did not report
a signiﬁcant impairment in task switching (Rogers et al., 1998).
The present study examines learning and switching between
stimulus-saccade mappings in PD using a rule switching task that
has been studied extensively in other patient groups. Although no
previous studies have examined PDs performance in this task,
their eye movements during more simple tests have been exten-
sively studied and a number of consistent ﬁndings are apparent.
For simple stimulus driven movements (so-called reﬂexive or “pro”
saccades) normal amplitude and response latency are typically
found in PD (e.g. Briand, Strallow, Hening, Poizner, & Sereno, 1999;
Fukushima, Fukushima, Miyasaka, & Yamashita, 1994; Hodgson,
Dittrich, Henderson, & Kennard, 1999; Lueck, Tanyeri, Crawford,
Henderson, & Kennard, 1990; Mosimann et al., 2005). However,
when movements are executed under memory-guided conditions
saccades become markedly hypometric, possibly due to disruption
of a functionally speciﬁc oculomotor cortico-striatal loop via the
caudate (Briand et al., 1999; Crawford, Henderson, & Kennard,
1989; Hodgson et al., 1999; Middleton & Strick, 2000). Similar
abnormalities in movement kinematics have been noted for
skeletomotor movements when responding under open loop
conditions (Alberts, Saling, Adler, & Stelmach, 2000; Jackson,
Jackson, Harrison, Henderson, & Kennard, 1995; Ketcham,
Hodgson, Kennard, & Stelmach, 2003; Rand & Stelmach, 2000;
Swinnen, Steyvers, VanDenBergh, & Stelmach, 2000). A general
theory of striatal function which is consistent with these ﬁndings is
that the caudate nucleus mediates “cognitive-motor” as opposed to
sensori-motor transformations when actions have to be generatedon the basis of an internally represented goal (Ketcham, Hodgson,
Kennard, & Stelmach, 2003; Levy, Friedman, Davachi, & Goldman-
Rakic, 1997; Postle, & D'Esposito, 1999). Saccadic hypometria under
memory-guided conditions may therefore reﬂect a problem in
executing actions based upon cognitive representations, rather than
an impairment in spatial working memory per se.
In the rule switching task participants learn a rule linking a
central cue with a saccade to either the left or the right (Hodgson,
Golding, Molyva, Rosenthal, & Kennard, 2004). The rule can reverse
at different points in the task as indicated by the positive/negative
feedbacks presented following each response. Interestingly, healthy
participants often make saccade errors following a rule change,
although these are usually followed by rapid corrective movements
(the computer only presents feedback when a ﬁxation longer than
800 ms has been made at one of the response locations, thus
allowing corrective movements to be made). The occurrence of such
corrected errors in the task is found to be greatly increased
following supplementary eye ﬁeld damage (Husain et al., 2003).
In contrast patients with inferior frontal cortex damage make
signiﬁcantly increased actual (uncorrected) errors when switching
between rules (Hodgson et al., 2007). Saccadic latencies are also
found to be much slower to the location at which a negative
feedback has been presented on a preceding trial and this negative
priming like effect (Tipper, 1985) is found to be reduced following
orbitofrontal cortex damage (Hodgson, Mort, Chamberlain, O'Neill,
& Kennard, 2002; Hodgson et al., 2004).
Given the previous ﬁndings in frontal patients and the known
pathology of cortico-striatal loops in PD a number of performance
deﬁcits in the rule switching task might be predicted even in mild
to moderately affected patients, with the exact nature of the
expected deﬁcits depending upon how one views the functional
organization of cortico-striatal circuits. For example, if the anterior
striatum forms a key functional component of the network via
which rules are monitored and maintained within working mem-
ory along with structures in the frontal cortex then PDs should
show very similar deﬁcits to lateral prefrontal lesion patients,
making increased errors in the task due to a failure to maintain in
mind the current rule. Consistent with this idea, a recent fMRI
study has suggested that preparatory set activity in frontal cortex
is disrupted during oculomotor task performance in PD (Cameron
et al., 2012). Alternatively, if the caudate nucleus simply forms a
conduit via which goal information is transformed from working
memory into action then patients should only show impairments
in more motoric measures (e.g. hypometria or saccadic correc-
tions). Finally, if PDs have a speciﬁc deﬁcit under conditions for
which two competing stimulus-response associations have to be
selected between then they should show impairments speciﬁc to
trials following a change in rule mappings, where such response/
rule conﬂict should be maximal.2. Experiment 1
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Subjects/patients
2.1.1.1. Control group. The control group comprised 15 participants selected to
match as closely as possible the age and gender of the patient group. Eight were
male and 7 were female. Ages ranged from 50 to 70 years with a mean age of
63 years.
2.1.1.2. Patient group. Nineteen patients with mild to moderate idiopathic PD par-
ticipated in Experiment 1. The mean age of the patient group was 63 years ranging
from 48 to 74 years. Patients were recruited from a volunteer database at Charing
Cross Hospital, London (13 patients) as well as via a movement disorders clinic at
the Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital (6 patients). Patient details are given in Table 1
including current medication, Hoen and Yahr (Hoehn & Yahr, 1967) and Webster
score assessments (Webster, 1968). The Webster assessment is almost identical to
T.L Hodgson et al. / Neuropsychologia 51 (2013) 1350–13601352the motoric sub-test of the uniﬁed parkinsons disease rating scale (Fahn & Elton,
1987) and approximate equivalent UPDRS III scores (based upon a linear rescaling
factor of 1.43) are given in the table. All patients were taking dopaminergic med-
ication at the time of testing. Research was approved initially by the Riverside
mental health ethics committee (Charing Cross Hospital patients) and then the
South West regional committee of the National NHS research ethics system (Exeter
patients) as well as via the School of Psychology, University of Exeter research
ethics committee.
Both patient and control groups completed the National Adult Reading Test
(NART), mini-mental and digit span test prior to oculomotor testing. Statistical
comparison of age and performance measures between groups via independent
two sample t-tests showed no statistically signiﬁcant differences in any factor.2.1.2. Eye movement recording
Eye movements were recorded using an Eyelink Eye Tracker (SR Research Ltd.),
a video based pupil tracker, with head movement compensation system sampling
at 250 Hz. Subjects were seated at a comfortable viewing distance in front of the
display monitor approximately 60 cm from the computer screen. Pupil position was
monitored via two miniature infrared CCD video cameras mounted on an
adjustable headband. Subjects were instructed to keep head movements to a
minimum and no active restraint of head movements was required to obtain
sufﬁciently accurate gaze position recordings. Eye movements were visualized off-
line, saccades were identiﬁed and artifacts removed using custom software
programs developed within the LabVIEW visual programming environment using
a saccade detection criterion threshold of 301 per second for at least 3 consecutive
samples. Approximately 4% of trials had to be excluded from analysis due to gross
artefacts or signal loss arising from eye-lid interference or blinks.2.1.3. Procedure
2.1.3.1. General. Experiment 1 comprised three blocks of trials, the ﬁrst requiring
learning of a single colour-saccade rule (Simple Associative task) the other two re-
quiring switching between two conﬂicting rules (Rule Switching task). Following
completion of consent forms, pencil and paper cognitive and disease assessments,
eye tracker setup and calibration (see above), patients completed the eye tracking
tasks. In addition to the rule switching tasks, patients and controls typically also
completed a number of other oculomotor tests during the testing session, the re-
sults of which are not reported in the current paper. Rule learning and switching
tasks were completed in a ﬁxed order with the Simple Associative (single rule)
blocks always presented prior to the switching blocks in Experiments 1 and 2. The
1st rule presented in the switching blocks was always the same as the rule
the patients had learned in the preceding Simple Associative block. Three of theTable 1
Patient details. Exp1¼Simple Associative Task and Rule Switching Tasks completed
recruitment; EX¼Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital. H&Y¼Hoen and Yahr sore; MM
UPDRS¼Uniﬁed Parkinsons Disease Rating Scale.
Patient Tasks
completed
Recruitment
site
Age Sex Medication
01 Exp1 CX 72 F Sinemet CR; Pramipexole
02 Exp1 CX 66 M Sinemet CR
03 Exp1a CX 56 M Sinemet; Sinemet CR; Caber
04 Exp1 CX 69 M Benhexol; Selegilin;
05 Exp1 CX 54 F Sinamet CR; Sinemet plus; p
06 Exp1a CX 74 M Sinemet; Sinemet CR
07 Exp1 CX 63 F Sinemet; Pergolide
08 Exp1 CX 54 F Madopar; Selegiline; Propan
09 Exp1 CX 57 M Sinemet
10 Exp1 CX 45 M Benhexol; Cabergoline
11 Exp1 CX 61 F Sinemet; Benhexol
12 Exp1 CX 56 F Pramipexole
13 Exp1 CX 48 M Sinemet CR; Pergolide
14 Exp1a; Exp2 EX 74 F Madopar; Pramipexole
15 Exp1; Exp2 EX 71 M Madopar
16 Exp1 EX 74 M Selegiline; Pramipexole
17 Exp1; Exp2 EX 72 M Pramiprexole; Sinemet
18 Exp1 EX 70 F Sinemet CR; Madopar
19 Exp2 EX 74 M Pramipexo
20 Exp2 EX 66 M Sinemet
21 Exp1a EX 79 F Sinemet; selegiline
22 Exp2 EX 65 M Pramipexole
23 Exp1 EX 71 M Madopar
24 Exp1; Exp2 EX 72 F Sinemet CR; Selegiline; Ama
25 Exp 2 EX 63 M Sinemet CR; pramipexolepatients and 3 of the control group also completed Experiment 2 (see below) at a
later testing session date.
2.1.3.2. Simple associative task. This was identical to the rule reversal task described
below except that the association between cue and correct response remained
constant throughout a block of 60 trials. Participants were instructed that the co-
lour of the cue indicated whether they should make a response to either the left or
right response box and that they had to work out which colour corresponded to
which response.
2.1.3.3. Rule switching task. Three boxes, outlined in black on a grey coloured
background, were presented in the centre and 91 to the left and right of the centre of
a 22 in. colour monitor. Each box subtended 31 of visual angle. Every trial was triggered
to start when the subject had been continuously ﬁxating the central location for a period
greater than 800 ms. Following this period, either a blue/red circle or a blue/yellow circle
was displayed in the central box (the two colour sets being varied randomly across
participants and each participant receiving only one colour set). The colour of the central
cue instructed the subject whether to look left or right. The next ﬁxation longer than
800 ms on either the left or the right box was taken as the subject's response on that
trial, such that several eye ﬁxations of shorter duration could bemade before the subject
made their ﬁnal decision. Once the participant had selected one of the boxes in this
manner, feedback was given to indicate if the choice was correct or incorrect in the form
of a happy/sad face displayed within the selected box, accompanied by a high or low
pitched tone (Fig. 1a). Subjects were made aware that the rule would reverse at several
points during the test but that the ﬁrst rule was always the same as that presented in
the Simple Associative task block. Rule changes were indicated by unexpected errors.
Each subject completed two blocks of 100 trials, comprising a maximum of 16
possible rule reversals. They were instructed to perform the task as quickly and as ac-
curately as possible and to respond on the basis of the rule they knew to be correct at
that time, without anticipating the occurrence of a rule change.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Simple Associative Task
Independent samples 2-tailed t-tests were used to compare the main perfor-
mance measures between PDs and healthy control participants. The point at which
participants were deemed to have learned the rule was set as the start of the ﬁrst
run of 8 consecutive correct responses (chosen as this was the point at which the
chances of a series of 8 random guesses conforming to the rule are less than 1/100).
The number of trials taken to reach this criterion was found to be signiﬁcantly
increased for PDs relative to the control group (t¼2.48, d.f.¼32, po0.025). There
was also a signiﬁcant difference in the number of response errors made by patients. Exp1a¼Simple Associative Task only completed. CX¼Charing Cross Hospital
SE¼Mini mental state assessment; NART¼National Adult Reading Test errors;
Disease
duration
Webster
(UPDRS III)
H&Y MMSE NART Digit Span
(total correct)
6 years 13 (19) 1.5 30 9 15
7 years 23 (33) 3 29 19 14
goline 9 years 24 (34) 3 23 5 13
10 years 5 (7) 1 30 8 15
ergoline 5 years 16 (23) 2.5 30 3 15
13 years 19 (27) 4 26 15 14
8 years 14 (20) 2.5 25 12 17
olol 6 years 14 (20) 2 28 21 12
6 years 15 (21) 2.5 29 7 18
5 years 11 (16) 2 27 11 18
1 years 2 (3) 1 30 8 22
6 years 13 (19) 1.5 30 20 18
4 years 26 (37) 3 27 24 16
7 years 5 (7) 1 30 14 15
18 months 8 (11) 2 29 13 15
4 Years 12.5 (18) 2 29 9 15
6 years 11 (16) 2 27 5 12
16 years 15 (21) 2 30 5 13
1 year 9 (13) 2 27 5 15
6 years 11 (16) 2 30 6 13
7 years 11 (16) 2.5 28 12 16
4 years 15 (21) 2.5 29 6 22
18 months 11 (16) 2.5 28 10 13
ntadine 7–8 years 11 (16) 2 27 5 15
13 years 11 (16) 2 26 10 11
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there was found to be no signiﬁcant difference in percentage errors between the
two groups in the remainder of the block (t¼0.99, d.f.¼30). Patients also showed
signiﬁcantly increased mean saccade response latencies in the simple associative
task (t¼2.27, d.f.¼32, po0.05). Primary saccade amplitude on correct response
trials (i.e. size of ﬁrst saccade on each trial) was found to be signiﬁcantly reduced
for PDs relative to controls during the Simple Associative Task blocks (t¼3.80,
d.f¼32, po0.001) (mean gain of saccadic amplitude relative to target position PDs:
0.82+−0.03; Controls: 0.97+−0.024).
2.2.2. Rule switching task
2.2.2.1. Saccadic amplitude. Primary saccadic amplitude was compared across
groups and relative to the trial position after rule switch using a 2-way ANOVAwith
Group (control/patient) and Trial after rule change (1–8) as factors. Results revealed
a strongly signiﬁcant effect of Group, with PDs showing signiﬁcant hypometria
relative to Control participants (F(1,30)¼16.03, po0.0001) (mean gain of saccadic
amplitude relative to target position PDs: 0.83+−0.02; Controls: 0.96+−0.02), but
there was no effect of Trial (F(7,210)¼1.42, p¼0.20) or interaction effect between
Trial and Group (F(7,210)¼1.33, p¼0.35) on saccade amplitude.
2.2.2.2. Saccadic latency. The latency (i.e. reaction time) of the ﬁrst saccade
following cue onset was analysed using a 2-way Analysis of variance with GroupFig. 1. Schematic of typical trial sequence in the rule switching tasks. Arrows represen
(Experiment 1), in which positive/negative feedbacks reliably indicate the rule. (b) Prob
80% likelihood when the optimal rule is used.
0
5
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Controls PDs
Trials to criterion  
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% Errors
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Trials to criterion  
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(Simple Association)
Expe
(Rule Switchin
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Fig. 2. Errors and trials to learning criterion for non-switching blocks in Experiments
Experiment 1 (*Indicates signiﬁcant difference between groups at po0.05 or greater. n(control/patient) and Trial after rule change as factors (trials 1–8). This revealed a
signiﬁcant main effect of Trial (F(7,210)¼20.02, po0.0001), but no main effect of
Group (F(1,30)¼1.52, p¼0.23) or interaction between Group and Trial (F(7,210)¼
0.21, p¼0.98). As expected based on previous studies (Hodgson et al., 2002b, 2004,
2007) latencies on the ﬁrst trial following the rule change was greatly increased
relative to all other trials (Fig. 3). However the size of the rule switch cost was not
signiﬁcantly greater in PDs compared to controls, neither was latency increased in
patients overall.
Latency on the trial immediately preceding the feedback which signalled a rule
change (labelled trial 0 in Fig. 3) was also analysed and showed no signiﬁcant
difference between groups (independent samples t-test: t¼1.34, d.f.¼30,
p¼0.19).
2.2.2.3. Response errors. 2-way Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were carried out
on error rates using Group (control/patient) and Trial after rule change (1–8) as
factors. Errors were classiﬁed according to whether or not they were corrected with
a secondary saccade prior to the feedback or uncorrected resulting in actual errors.
The total number of errors (corrected plus uncorrected) was signiﬁcantly increased
on the ﬁrst trial following a rule change (effect of Trial F(7,210)¼8.92, po0.0001),
but there was no main effect of Group (F(1,30)¼1.37, p¼0.251) or interaction
between Trial and Group (F(1,150)¼0.88, p¼0.52) (Fig. 3). Total errors trials on the
trial for which participants received the feedback that indicated a rule change (i.e.t saccadic responses to left or right response box: (a) standard rule switching task
ablistic rule switching task (Experiment 2) for which positive feedbacks occur with
Controls PDs
% Errors
Controls PDs
Trials to criterion  
Controls PDs
% Errors
Experiment 2  
(Probabilistic Association task)
riment 1  
g: 1st switch only)
n.s 
n.s n.s 
1 and 2 and the ﬁrst rule change encountered in the rule switching condition of
.s.¼non-signiﬁcant difference).
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(independent samples t-test: t¼0.646, d.f.¼30, p¼0.523).
For corrected errors a signiﬁcant main effect of Trial was found (F(7,2100)¼6.01,
po0.0001), but there was no main effect of Group (F(1,30)¼0.43, p¼0.52) or
interaction between Group and Trial (F(7,210)¼1.92, p¼0.07). Corrected errors
were also not signiﬁcantly different between groups on rule change trials
(independent samples t-test: t¼0.43, d.f.¼30, p¼0.66).
For uncorrected errors (i.e. actual errors in which a negative feedback resulted)
there was a signiﬁcant effect of Trial (F(7,210)¼7.26, po0.001) and a main effect of
Group (F(7,30)¼5.87, p¼0.022) but no signiﬁcant interaction between Group and
Trial (F(7,210)¼0.83, p¼0.56). The interaction between Trial and Group was also
non-signiﬁcant when the ﬁrst trial following a rule change was compared to all
subsequent trials (F(1,30)¼0.51, p¼0.48). Although there was a trend towards
increased uncorrected errors later in a rule (see Fig. 3) direct means comparisons
showed no evidence for a selective increase in error rates in the run up to a rule
change (indicative of possible anticipatory rule changes), with no signiﬁcant
difference in error rates between groups for responses occurring more than 6 trials
after a rule change (t¼1.23, d.f.¼30, p¼0.225) and no signiﬁcant difference in
uncorrected errors between groups on trials immediately preceding a rule change
(trial 0) (t¼0.545, d.f.¼30, p¼0.59).
As the ﬁrst rule change in the switching blocks always required participants to
implement a reverse mapping to that which they had initially learned in the Simple
Associative block, we also examined whether patients were impaired at acquiring
this ﬁrst example of the reversed rule relative to controls. This showed that PDs
were not any worse than controls at acquiring the ﬁrst instance of the reversed
rule. PDs typically switched rule within 2 trials and did not make a signiﬁcantly
increased number of errors in this block relative to controls or other switches
(Trials to Criterion PD: 1.82; Con: 1.60; t¼1.01, d.f.¼30, p¼0.28; Errors PD: 6%;
Con: 2%; t¼0.30, d.f.¼30, p¼0.76) (Fig. 2).
2.2.2.4. Negative priming effect. Previous studies using the task have reported
a marked slowing of response times for trials on which a participant is cued back
to the location at which a negative feedback had been presented on the previous
trial (Hodgson et al., 2002, 2004; Huddy et al., 2011). A 3-way ANOVA with Type
of feedback on previous trial (positive/negative), Direction of response (same/
different to last trial) and Group (control/patient) conﬁrmed a signiﬁcant main
effect of Type (F(1,30)¼44.56, po0.0001), Direction (F(1,30)¼11.56, po0.005)
and a 2-way interaction between Type and Direction on primary saccadeTotal
Corre
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Fig. 3. Errors and latencies in the two rule switching tasks plotted against trials after rule
contingent post-response feedback was modiﬁed, such that “errors” represent responses
reliable. (b) Experiment 2 in which feedback only indicated the optimal rule with 80%latencies (F(1,30)¼17.34, po0.001). Latencies were signiﬁcantly slower on trials
following a negative feedback and particularly so for saccades directed back
towards the same location at which the response had been directed on the
preceding trial. Although the 3-way interaction with Group did not reach
signiﬁcance (F(1,30)¼0.78, p¼0.38) and an independent samples t-test directly
comparing the size of the effect between groups showed no signiﬁcant
difference between PDs and Controls, examination of mean latencies revealed
that the magnitude of the effect was reduced in PDs. Paired sample t-tests
showed that for control subjects latencies were signiﬁcantly elevated for
different relative to same direction responses following a negative feedback
(t¼3.57, d.f.¼14, po0.001), whereas the difference was not signiﬁcant for PDs
(t¼2.04, d.f.¼16, p¼0.06) (Fig. 4).
A bias to respond away from a negative feedback was also apparent in the
direction of response errors. Errors were more likely to be made away from the
location of a negative feedback but not a positive feedback (feedback Type by
Direction interaction F(1,29)¼17.16, po0.0001). However, this interaction did not
differ signiﬁcantly in magnitude between the control and patient group.2.2.3. Correlations with disease severity
The goodness of ﬁt of optimized linear and quadratic functions (see Cools,
Barker, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2001b, 2001c; Rowe et al., 2008) were assessed for the
relationship between Webster/UPDRS III scores and each of the following depen-
dent measures: Total number of corrected and uncorrected errors in the task;
Corrected and uncorrected error rates on the ﬁrst versus second trial after a rule
switch; Mean saccade latencies across all trials; Mean saccade latencies on the ﬁrst
versus second trial after rule change (i.e. latency switch cost); mean saccadic gain;
The negative priming effect on saccade latency (deﬁned as the latency difference
between responses directed towards the same versus different response location to
the last trial following a negative feedback).
Using the standard alpha value of 0.05 used in all the above analysis, the only
performance measure which showed a relationship with disease severity was the
magnitude of the negative priming effect. This showed a quadratic relationship
with disease severity (R2¼0.447; F(2,14)¼5.64, p¼0.016) being increased in
magnitude for the least severe and most severely affected patients compared to
those in the middle range of severity. However, this correlation zwas not deemed to
be signiﬁcant when a correction was applied for multiple statistical comparisons
(Bon Ferroni corrected alpha of 0.0031). Errors
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Fig. 4. Reward related negative priming effect on saccade response latencies in
patients and controls. Responses were signiﬁcantly slowed when saccades are cued
back to the same location at which a negative feedback had been presented on the
previous trial (difference between same and different direction trials following a
negative feedback *po0.001; n.s. indicates non-signiﬁcant).
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The key ﬁndings of Experiment 1 are that PDs were unimpaired
at switching between conﬂicting stimulus-saccade mappings in
terms of the magnitude of the “switch cost” on response errors and
saccade latencies following a change in rule mappings. However,
PDs made increased uncorrected response errors overall in switch-
ing blocks and were also slower than controls at learning the ﬁrst
cue-saccade rule in the initial uniform rule block. These ﬁnding are
interesting in the light of previous studies which have examined
task switching in PD as well as earlier studies using the oculo-
motor rule switching task in other patient populations.
Cools et al. (2001a) attempted to disambiguate the nature of
the Parkinsonian deﬁcit in cognitive ﬂexibility by dissociating the
attentional set switching, rule switching and working memory
components of classic cognitive switching tasks. This was achieved
by explicitly cuing task rules (eliminating the working memory
component) and presenting response imperative stimuli which
could either be in conﬂict with both, or exclusively associated with
one of the two possible task rules (isolating the response/atten-
tional conﬂict component). It was concluded that the deﬁcit in PD
arose during rule switching only under conditions of conﬂict and
could not be explained by other factors such as working memory
load. However, in the rule switching task used here there is always
rule conﬂict as cues can indicate a left or a right response
dependent upon the rule. The test also places demands on work-
ing memory and attentional selection processes as the current rule
has to be held in mind and distracting information (e.g. the
alternate rule) needs to be ignored. In this sense the absence of
a clear switching deﬁcit in the PD group is surprising.
More recent work has extended Cools et al.’s original ﬁndings
and has further clariﬁed the conditions under which mild to
moderate PDs show a deﬁcit in task switching. Kehagia, Cools,
Barker and Robbins (2009) and Pollux (2004) both used proce-
dures which manipulated the demand to select between task
relevant visual information on each trial as well as switching
between stimulus-response mappings associated with the same
visual cue. Deﬁcient performance was only seen under conditions
for which task irrelevant visual stimuli had to be ignored, whereas
simple switching between two mutually incompatible stimulus-
response mappings was found to be relatively normal in early
stage medicated patients (i.e. a result compatible with the ﬁndings
reported here). Kehagia concluded that dopaminergic striatal
dysfunction (for which early stage PD seems a reasonable model)
does not lead to a deﬁcit in task rule switching per se, but does
impair the ability to ﬁlter out task irrelevant perceptual input. The
discrepancy with earlier ﬁndings may be due to the severity and
heterogeneity of patients tested in previous studies with only
more severely affected patients having a clear impairment in pure
stimulus-response rule switching (Kehagia et al., 2009).
The performance of the mild medicated PDs described here
constitutes a double dissociation in the oculomotor rule switching
task when compared to impairments seen following inferior
frontal cortical damage, in which initial rule learning was found
to be intact, but performance in the rule switching blocks was
markedly impaired (Hodgson et al., 2007). If it is assumed that PDs'
suffer from a disruption to fronto-striatal circuitry, then these
ﬁndings imply that damage to this network does not lead to
identical sequelae regardless of the site of disruption, but instead
can produce speciﬁc effects dependent upon whether cortical or
sub-cortical components are affected. The performance of PDs also
has interesting differences and similarities when compared to a
patient with a well circumscribed supplementary eye ﬁeld lesion
who has been tested using the same task (Husain et al., 2003;
Parton et al., 2007). Unlike PDs, this individual made a greatly
increased number of corrected saccade errors on the trialsimmediately following rule changes, but showed slower learning
of novel stimulus-saccade associations (Parton et al., 2007). It is
possible that forming new arbitrary associations between stimuli
and saccades is a key function of the cortico-striatal circuit linking
the supplementary eye ﬁelds with the striatum, with damage to
either component of the circuit in this case leading to impairments
in this ability.
Another aspect of the current task which has been investigated
in patients elsewhere is the slowing of responses directed back to
locations at which negative feedbacks have been presented on the
previous trial. This reward dependent negative priming effect
(Tipper, 1985) is reduced in magnitude following orbitofrontal/
ventro-medial prefrontal damage (Hodgson et al., 2002). Schizo-
phrenic patients have also been shown to have an enhanced bias
to respond away from negative feedbacks in the task relative to
controls (Huddy et al., 2011). In this study the effect was found to
be reduced in magnitude in the PD group (Fig. 4) and did not reach
statistical signiﬁcance, whilst still being strongly signiﬁcant for
control participants. However, the 2-way group by negative prim-
ing interaction did not reach statistical signiﬁcance, suggesting
that the magnitude of the effect was more variable rather than
being consistently reduced across patients.
Issues of statistical power need to be considered in relation to
the absence of a signiﬁcant interaction effect between Group and
the Negative Priming effect. A key issue is whether the effect is
consistently inconsistent independent of sample size for the PD
group. In order to examine this, a simple “resampling” approach
was used in which a randomly selected sub-set of controls and
patients were analysed to assess whether a similar pattern was
observed with fewer participants (7 controls and 9 patients chosen
via the random case selection function within SPSS v19). This
analysis once again revealed a highly signiﬁcant priming effect
overall in the reduced data set (F(1,12)¼10.68, p¼0.007) and an
insigniﬁcant interaction effect between Group and the negative
priming effect (although with a higher F-value than that found in
the main analysis: F(1,12)¼2.66 relative to F(1,30)¼0.78). As in the
main analysis however, the negative priming effect was found to
be highly signiﬁcant for controls (F(1,7)¼12.72, p¼0.009) but not
for patients (F(1,5)¼1.37, p¼0.295) when the two groups of the
sub-set were analysed separately. This suggests that the absence of
a signiﬁcant interaction between participant group and the nega-
tive priming effect reﬂects genuine hetereogeneity within the
PD group.
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to refer to the response negative priming effect observed in the
rule switching task. This phrase was originally coined by Posner
et al. to describe an increase in response time to targets appearing
at recently stimulated locations (Posner, Rafal, Choate, & Vaughan,
1985). However, several authors have speculated that the effect
may be important in contexts far removed from the classical
spatial cueing procedure. For example, its utility in controlling
eye movements during search (Gilchrist & Harvey, 2000) or as a
“foraging facilitator” has been suggested (Klein & MacInnes, 1999).
Consistent with this idea our own previous studies has shown that
a reduced inhibition of return/negative priming effect in the rule
switching task is associated with disorganized/inefﬁcient visual
search strategies following orbitofrontal cortex damage (Hodgson
et al., 2002). It is also interesting to note that recent work
has shown that PDs have disordered eye movement search
patterns characterized by increased re-ﬁxations of targets and
distractors during visual search (Mannan, Hodgson, Husain, &
Kennard, 2008).
In summary, the results on the one hand are consistent with
previous ﬁndings which have shown that stimulus-response rule
switching performance is relatively intact in early stage PDs,
whilst at the same time suggesting an impairment in learning
novel stimulus-response mappings and a possible deﬁciency in
processing of negative feedbacks dependent upon dopaminergic
state. But once an initial rule has been learned patients appear to
be able to utilize relatively intact cognitive representations of task
rules to maintain and switch between related SR mappings as
indicated by the lack of a signiﬁcant difference in acquiring the
ﬁrst instance of the reversed rule in switching blocks (Fig. 2). If
this is the case then PDs might be expected to be maximally
impaired at tasks which placed enhanced demands on “trial and
error” type learning and rely less on explicit representations of
task rules. Experiment 2 was therefore designed to investigate the
idea that there might be two types of learning, one based on
explicit knowledge of rules, the other based on associative learn-
ing processes, and that the second of these mechanisms may be
the one which is primarily affected in the early stages of PD. We
compared patients and controls on a modiﬁed version of the rule
switching task in which feedback was given stochastically such
that a “correct” response only resulted in a positive feedback with
80% probability. In all other respects the task was closely matched
to that used in Experiment 1.4. Experiment 2
4.1. Methods
4.1.1. Participants
The control group comprised 8 neurologically normal partici-
pants. 2 were female and 6 were female. Ages ranged from 50 to
70 years, with a mean age of 57 years. Eight patients with mild to
moderate PD were recruited from the movement disorders clinic
at the Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital. Six were male and 2 were
female. Their ages ranged from 63 to 74, with a mean age of 62
years. Three of the control subjects and 3 of the PD patients had
previously completed the simple rule reversal task in an earlier
testing session.
4.1.2. Task and procedure
The task and procedure were identical to those used in
Experiment 1 accept for the following differences. Feedback given
by the computer was only reliable on 80% of the trials, such that
adehence to the currently correct rule would not reliably produce
a correct feedback and execution of the “incorrect” response couldproduce a positive feedback on 20% of the trials (Fig. 1b). Partici-
pants were instructed that the computer used a rule linking the
colour of the central cue with saccades to the left or right, but that
the computer would sometimes “tell lies” such that it would only
give you accurate feedback around 80% of the time. As before they
were also told that the rule the computer was using could change
“several times” during the course of the test and their task was to
“ﬁnd as many happy faces as possible”.
The central cue was always either yellow or blue in Experi-
ment 2. The start of each new rule within the switching blocks was
deemed to be the ﬁrst trial after a negative feedback had been
received following a change in rule (i.e. due to the probabilistic
nature of the task a false positive feedback could occur by chance
following a change in probabilistic contingencies such that it
would have been impossible for the participant to know that the
rule had changed). Based upon this criterion, rule changes
occurred in a uniformly random distribution every 10–16 trials.
Participants completed an initial block of 80 trials in which the
optimal response rule stayed the same throughout (Probabilistic
Association task). They then completed two blocks of 80 trials in
which the rule could change (Probabilistic Reversal task) with an
average of 6 rule changes occurring in each block.
We use the terms “Rule” and “Errors” in the methods, results
and discussion of Experiment 2 for consistency in relation to
Experiment 1, although the probabilistic nature of the task means
that there is always uncertainty associated with optimal stimulus-
response-outcome mappings and a number of sub-optimal rule
based strategies can be applied in the task (see “Strategic effects on
saccade direction” below). Based upon the deﬁnition of a correct
response as conforming to a response selected on the basis of an
optimal rule, the “trials to criterion” measure used to measure
speed of rule learning in the simple associative blocks (see
Experiment 1 methods) was determined using the same criterion
of 8 consecutive correct trials as was used in Experiment 1.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Probabilistic association
Independent sample, 2-tailed t-tests were used to compare the
main performance measures between PDs and healthy control
participants in the probabilistic association block in which parti-
cipants had to learn a single stochastically reinforced colour-
saccade association. The results showed that PDs had signiﬁcantly
elevated primary saccade latencies (t¼2.65, d.f.¼14, p¼0.019) and
reduced amplitude saccades in the task (t¼3.90, 14, p¼0.003) in
the task, but there was no signiﬁcant difference in error rates
(t¼1.25, p¼0.23) or trials to criterion (t¼1.36, p¼0.195) (Fig. 2).
4.2.2. Probabilistic rule switching
4.2.2.1. Saccadic amplitude. Primary saccadic amplitude (i.e. size of
ﬁrst saccade on each trial) was analysed using a 2-way ANOVA
with subject group (control/patient) and trial after rule change
(1–8) as factors. PDs saccades showed signiﬁcant saccadic
hypometria relative to control participants (main effect of Group
F(1,14)¼4.65, po0.05), but there was no effect of Trial (F(7,98)¼
1.14, p¼0.16) or interaction between Trial and Group (F(7,98)¼
0.89, p¼0.48).
4.2.2.2. Saccade latencies. The latency of the ﬁrst saccade following
cue onset was analysed using a 2-way Analysis of variance with
Group (control/patient) and Trial after rule change (1–8) as factors.
This revealed a signiﬁcant effect of Group (F(1,14)¼5.81, p¼0.04),
with latencies being increased in PDs relative to controls. There
was a signiﬁcant main effect of trial (F(7,98)¼3.45, p¼0.002) but
no interaction effect between Trial and Group (F(7,98)¼0.80,
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feedback which signalled a rule change (labelled trial 0 in Fig. 3)
were also analysed and found not to differ signiﬁcantly between
groups (independent samples t-test t¼1.52, d.f.¼14, p¼0.15).4.2.2.3. Errors. In the case of the probabilistic reversal task, “errors”
were deﬁned as saccadic responses which were directed towards
the location speciﬁed by the sub-optimal rule. As in Experiment 1,
a distinction was made between uncorrected and corrected errors
for which an initial saccade in the “incorrect” direction was rapidly
followed by a secondary saccade towards the alternate location.
A 2-way Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were carried out on
total errors (corrected and uncorrected) with Group (control/
patient) and Trial after rule change (1–8) as factors. This revealed
a signiﬁcant effect of Trial (F(7,98)¼2.78, p¼0.011) across all
participants and a signiﬁcant effect of Group (F(1,12)¼2.76,
p¼0.048) but no interaction between Trial and Group (F(7,98)¼
1.18). Total errors (based on the updated rule) on the trial for
which participants received the feedback that indicated a rule
change (i.e. trial 0) found to be signiﬁcant reduced in the PD group
(t¼2.29, d.f.¼14, p¼0.038).
A similar analysis for uncorrected errors revealed a signiﬁcant
effect of Group (F(1,14)¼7.17, p¼0.018) as well as Trial (F(7,98)¼
3.57, p¼0.002). The interaction between Trial and Group was also
signiﬁcant when the ﬁrst trial following a rule change was
compared to subsequent trials (F(2,13)¼5.34, p¼0.02). Means
comparisons revealed that the difference in error rates between
groups was only signiﬁcant for responses more than 3 trials
following a rule change (independent sample t-test t¼2.73,
d.f.¼14, po0.02), with no signiﬁcant difference apparent when
the analysis was conﬁned to responses on the 1st to 3rd trial after
the rule change (t¼0.137, p¼0.893) (Fig. 3b). As with total errors,
analysis of uncorrected errors on Trial 0 showed a trend towards
reduced errors in the PD group, but no signiﬁcant difference
between groups (t¼1.53, d.f.¼14, p¼0.05).
Analysis of corrected errors (expressed as a percentage of all
trials) showed no signiﬁcant difference between Group (F(1,14)¼
0.568, p¼0.46), Trial after rule change (F(7,98)¼1.27, p¼0.274) or
interaction between Group and Trial (F(7,98)¼0.416, p¼0.89),
indicating that PDs were no more or less likely than controls to
make corrected response errors. There was no signiﬁcant differ-
ence in corrected errors for Trial 0 between the two groups
(t¼1.25, d.f.¼14, po0.23).4.2.2.4. Negative primiing effect. A 3-way ANOVA with Type of
feedback on previous trial (positive/negative), Direction of
response (Same/Different to last trial) and Group (PD/Control)
was used to assess whether a feedback modulated negative
priming effect was present with probabilistic feedback. Although
latencies were found to be signiﬁcantly slower for trials
immediately following a negative feedback (F(1,14)¼11.62,
po0.005), this effect did not interact with the direction of
response (F(1,14)¼1.89, p¼0.191) and there were no higher
order interaction effects involving Group.4.2.2.5. Correlations with disease severity. We examined whether
performance measures were correlated with disease severity using
linear and quadratic ﬁt functions. Using a standard alpha value of
0.05 to assess signiﬁcance there was a signiﬁcant positive linear
relationship between disease severity and the number of
corrective saccade errors (F(1,6)¼9.48, p¼0.022) and a
signiﬁcant linear correlation between mean response latency
overall, with response latency decreasing with UPDRS/Webster
score (F(1,6)¼7.01, p¼0.038). However, none of the correlationswere judged to be signiﬁcant based upon a Bon Ferroni corrected
signiﬁcance threshold of p¼0.0031.
4.2.2.6. Strategic effects on saccade direction. Two possible
explanations for the increased error rates in patients relative to
controls would be that they were either updating rules too
frequently (e.g. following each negative feedback received) or
not frequently enough (e.g. using the same response rule
throughout a block). In order to test this we examined whether
subjects used the same or a different rule to determine the
direction of their saccadic response on the current relative to the
last trial, dependent upon whether the last feedback was either
positive or negative. This analysis showed that, based upon the
direction of the primary saccade executed by participants on each
trial, rules were updated more frequently following a negative
relative to a positive feedback (15% following +ve relative to 46%
following –ve feedback overall: F(1,14)¼45.10, po0.001), but the
rate of spontaneous rule updating between the two groups did not
differ (Con: 27% versus PDs: 33%; F(1,14)¼0.861, p¼0.37), neither
was there interaction between group and feedback type on the
degree to which the rule was updated (10% of trials in Controls
versus 20% in PDs following +ve feedback; 45% in Controls and 47%
in PDs following −ve feedback; F(1,14)¼0.671, p¼0.43).
Participants also showed evidence for use of response alterna-
tion strategy, such that they were more likely to make saccades
opposite to the location they had selected on the preceding trial
(F(1,12)¼13.87, p¼0.002; Same direction: 40.8%; Different: 59.8%).
Unlike Experiment 1 however, this bias was not dependent upon
the type of feedback received on the last trial (positive versus
negative) (57% versus 61% different direction responses on positive
versus negative feedback trials respectively; F(1,14)¼1.07, p¼
0.32), neither was there a difference in the use of this sub-
optimal strategy across the two participant groups (main effect
of group: F(1,14)¼2.11, p¼0.17; interaction between group and
feedback type: F(1,14)¼1.065, p¼0.32).5. General discussion
The key ﬁnding of Experiment 2 was that PDs made increased
errors and longer response latencies relative to controls when
switching between stimulus-saccade associations which were
subject to stochastic reinforcement. Several possible accounts will
be considered which might explain the ﬁndings of the two
experiments together.
The ﬁrst possibility is that PDs' deﬁcit in learning and main-
taining stimulus-response mappings is a side effect of dopaminer-
gic medication. Recent computational simulations have suggested
that dopaminergic medication could affect associative learning
processes (Chakravarthy et al., 2010; Frank, 2005; Graybiel, 1997;
Schultz, Dayan and Montague, 1997) and other work has also
suggested that mild medicated but not un-medicated patients
show deﬁcits in monitoring probabilistic contingenices (Swainson
et al., 2000). Such a medication effect would be of interest both in
terms of its implications for people with Parkinsons, as well as for
our understanding of the function of dopamine within cortico-
striatal circuitry. Ethical constraints precluded us pursuing a direct
comparison of patients on and off medication, but even if we had
been able to do so the relationship between dopaminergic state
and performance is such that a simple On/Off medication compar-
ison would not provide a conclusive test of a medication based
explanation (Cools et al., 2001c; Rowe et al., 2008).
An alternative view of the results is that they reﬂect a disease
related impairment in stimulus-induced distractibility across all
PD patients under conditions where one stimulus has to be
attended to whilst another has to be ignored (Kehagia et al.,
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participants need to ignore distracting negative feedbacks and act
on the basis of the rule they know to be correct. However, analysis
of the pattern of errors in both Experiment 1 and 2 showed that
patients were no more likely than controls to make a response
error away from the location of a negative feedback on the
previous trial, suggesting that they were not overly distracted by
negative feedbacks. Furthermore, analysis of strategic factors
affecting saccade direction in Experiment 2 showed that both
groups made use of sub-optimal response and rule alternation
strategies, whereby they spontaneously changed response rules or
selected the alternate response direction relative to the preceding
trial. However, the rate of spontaneous rule updating and response
alternation following negative feedbacks did not differ between
the two groups as might be expected if PDs were more distracted
relative to controls.
Another possibility is that the increase in errors observed in
PDs in both experiments is due to anticipatory updating of rules.
The increase in uncorrected errors for PD patients was largely
conﬁned to later trials following a rule change in Experiment 1. In
the case of the probabilistic task this would predict increased
errors in PDs following the occurrence of “false” negative feed-
backs. However, this was not found top be the case (see above and
Experiment 2, Results: Strategic effects on saccade direction). At the
same time, the signiﬁcant increase in latencies for responses on
trials occurring more than 6 trials after a rule change in Experi-
ment 2 (Fig. 2b) might be seen as consistent with participants
generating an expectation or anticipating an upcoming rule
change. For both experiments the signiﬁcant increase in errors
for PD patients was due primarily to the occurrence of errors on
later trials (rather than those immediately following a rule
change). This pattern would be consistent with increased antici-
patory updating of rules in the PD group or failures to maintain
rules in working memory (i.e. loss of set).
As fewer participants were used in Experiment 2 relative to
Experiment 1 it is possible that differences in statistical power
might explain apparent dissociations in performance between the
two versions of the task. In particular, the absence of a signiﬁcant
difference in performance between patients and controls in the
Probabilistic Association rule learning block for Experiment 2
(Fig. 2) should be interpreted with caution. Taking a similar
resampling approach to that outlined in the discussion of power
effects for Experiment 1 (see above), analysis of a randomly
selected sub-sample of participants from Experiment 1 (8 patients
and 8 control participants) revealed insigniﬁcant differences in
errors (t¼1.83, p¼0.089) and trials to criterion (t¼1.52, p¼0.15)
for the Simple Association task block. A selective impairment in PD
for learning single rules under conditions of reliable relative to
probabilistic feedback therefore seems unlikely as well as being
theoretically implausible (as both tasks would engage similar
mechanisms responsible for trial and error learning). However,
the issue of reduced participants numbers in Experiment 2 cannot
easily explain the key ﬁnding in relation to switching blocks.
Signiﬁcant interaction effects between Trial and Group were
apparent in switching blocks with fewer patients in Experiment
2 (8 patients), but were absent with the larger sample size
available in Experiment 1 (16 patients).
Another explanation for the lack of a signiﬁcant difference
between patient and controls in the probabilistic association block
(Experiment 2) is the increased demands placed on control
subjects, rather than relatively enhanced performance in patients.
Although well matched with the non-probablistic rule switching
procedure in terms of visuo-motor characteristics, the pro-
babilistic rule switching task (Experiment 2) has some impor-
tant differences which are worthy of discussion. Learning
rules with stochastic feedback implicitly demands integration ofcue–response–outcome relationships over the course of several
trials. It is not possible for rule changes to be reliably detected
based upon evidence accumulated in a single trial, such that a
clearly deﬁned single trial “switch cost” would not be expected in
the probabilistic version of the task. A cost is observed on response
errors for control participants (but not PDs) following rule changes
in Experiment 2 reﬂecting increased certainty regarding the
correct rule as the number of trials after a rule switch increases.
However, as any given negative feedback has a 20% chance of
being a “false” error in the task, even a perfect observer needs to
integrate information over at least 2 consecutive trials before
establishing with 95% certainty the “correct” rule. The lack of a
signiﬁcant increase in response latencies immediately following a
rule change also suggests that the cognitive demands of the task
may be more continuous in probabilistic rule switching relative to
the standard version of the task.
A consistent ﬁnding between Experiment 1 and 2 was that
patients' saccadic eye movements were hypometric relative to
controls. Previously, Parkinsonian hypometria has only been found
consistently under “open loop” or memory-guided conditions
where peripheral target stimuli are not present. Responding in
stimulus driven conditions is typically found to be normal or even
show evidence for speeding of response latencies under certain
conditions in PD (Chambers & Prescott, 2010). The present experi-
ments suggest that hypometria may occur under other conditions
where saccades have to be made partially on the basis of internal
cognitive representations (in this case learned rules or stimulus
response mappings) even when visual markers for responding are
provided in the display. Hypometria in saccadic movements when
they have to be executed based upon cognitive representations is
also consistent with the theory that the dorsal striatum is involved
in the release of goal directed acts, rather than habitual or stimulus
elicited behaviour (Grahn et al., 2008).
Interestingly, Parkinsonian like hypometria in memory-guided
saccades has also been reported following supplementary motor
area damage, alongside impaired learning of novel stimulus-
saccade associations (Parton et al., 2007). One possibility is that
rather than reﬂecting abnormal function of a putative frontal eye
ﬁeld-caudate nucleus circuit or a medication induced dysfunction
within striatal associative learning systems, both hypometria and
rule learning impairments in PD instead represent disease related
dysfunction to a dorso-medial frontal-putamen circuit (Alexander
& Crutcher, 1990; Grahn et al., 2008). Interestingly, very recent
combined fMRI and DTI imaging studies have questioned the
existence of a dedicated oculomotor loop via the caudate nucleus
and have instead highlighted an oculomotor role for the putamen
in the control of volitional saccades (Neggers et al., 2012).
Another aspect of oculomotor function which has often been
claimed to be impaired in PD is inhibitory suppression of move-
ments elicited by a peripheral stimulus onset (Briand et al., 1999;
Chan, Armstrong, Pari, Riopelle, & Munoz, 2005; Fukushima et al.,
1994; van Koningsbruggen, Pender, Machado, & Rafal,, 2009; Lueck
et al., 1990). Signiﬁcantly increased corrected saccades in the rule
switching task following a change in stimulus-response mappings
have also been interpreted as representing failures to inhibit
saccades in response to a centrally presented cue based upon
recently active rules/associations (Hodgson et al., 2004, 2007;
Husain et al., 2003). Based upon this measure of inhibitory control
however, the present study found no evidence for an impairment
in this type of inhibitory control in mild medicated PDs.6. Summary and conclusions
The results show that mild to moderately affected people with
Parkinsons disease (PDs) are impaired in tasks which require learning
T.L Hodgson et al. / Neuropsychologia 51 (2013) 1350–1360 1359of novel stimulus-saccade mappings or switching between stochas-
tically reinforced mappings. When the stimulus-saccade rules under-
lying a task are more transparent, PDs show normal response times
and error rates. These ﬁndings are interpreted as evidence for an
impairment in associative learning processes in PDs, accompanied by
relatively intact cognitive representations of task rules.
Further research could investigate how these ﬁndings might
relate to performance of everyday tasks which require coordina-
tion of arbitrary mappings between perceptual cues and saccadic
responses (Land & Furneax, 1997; Poliakoff & Smith Spark, 2008;
Tatler, Hayhoe, Land, & Ballard, 2011). One prediction is that mild
medicated PDs should have more difﬁculty learning new visuo-
motor tasks and skills (e.g. learning to cook a new recipe or
operate a new computer programme) than they would in per-
forming and switching between routine tasks that have already
been learned.Acknowledgements
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